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THE APRIL AMT SHOCK: TAX REFORM
ADVICE FOR THE NEW MAJORITY
dimitri b. papadimitriou and l. randall wray
Anyone who reads a newspaper knows that most Americans have accumulated
excessive levels of debt, and realizes that as interest rates climb, it becomes more
difficult to service financial liabilities. To add insult to injury, wage growth has
been slow, while prices—especially for energy—have risen sharply. What is not
clear, however, is the fact that taxes have also been rising rapidly, relative to both
income and government spending.In this Policy Note,we concentrate on the last
issue, and argue that many middle-income earners will find themselves unpre-
pared for the coming surprise in April.
Many of our colleagues, at the Levy Institute and elsewhere, have recognized the danger sig-
naled by changes in household  debt-to-income ratios.These have been rising on trend for decades,
but their rate of climb accelerated sharply in the mid-1990s as the private sector began to run per-
sistent deficits,with only a temporary respite during the recession of the early 2000s (Godley 1999,
2003).When the Federal Reserve (Fed) began to raise interest rates two years ago,debt service ratios
once again started to climb, forcing households to devote more of their disposable income to sat-
isfying debt and interest payments. Several recent Levy Institute publications have examined this
issue (Papadimitriou,Chilcote,Zezza 2006; Papadimitriou,Zezza,Hannsgen 2006).Problems have2 Policy Note, 2007 / 1
been compounded during the past year, as rising energy prices
absorbed an ever-growing share of household income. Higher
energy prices, in turn, have fueled inflation as measured by the
consumer price index (CPI). Furthermore, sluggish labor mar-
kets—which have added relatively few jobs even during the
expansion of recent years—have generated slow growth of wages.
As a result,increases in prices paid by consumers are outstripping
meager wage gains. In response, consumers appear to have cut
back spending and borrowing in recent months, as evidenced by
dismal reports from the domestic automobile industry and the
real estate sector.
What has received far less attention,however,is the squeeze
placed on U.S. middle-income households by rapidly rising tax
burdens.Indeed,many commentators have welcomed the “good”
news that federal budget deficits appear to be on a falling trend,
with government revenues growing much faster than spending.
The new Democratic majority in Congress is promising compre-
hensive “tax reform” while calling for a return to “pay-as-you-
go” budgeting. This requires that any tax reforms that reduce
revenue would have to be offset by either “revenue enhance-
ments” (increases in other taxes) or spending cuts, or both. We
will argue that this would be a huge mistake,because debt-ridden
consumers need tax relief. In this, we agree with Congressman
CharlesRangel (the current chair of Ways and Means) in calling
for substantial reform of the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT).
We disagree, however, with any attempt to replace revenue lost
through such reform, because the overall tax burden is already
excessive—and growing.
Comptroller General David M.Walker has been campaign-
ing across the country on his “Fiscal Wake-Up Tour,”warning of
a looming economic disaster based on projections of continuing
budget deficits (Crenson 2006).This is part of a well-orchestrated
attempt to convince Americans that their social safety net cannot
be retained unless taxes are raised (or other government spend-
ing is cut) by prohibitive amounts.We have examined elsewhere
the flaws in these long-term projections of shortfalls amounting
to trillions of dollars (Papadimitriou and Wray 1999;Wray 2005).
In this Policy Note, we will focus on the medium-term projec-
tions of the fiscal stance over the next decade.We will argue that,
contrary to the position promoted by some policymakers, fiscal
policy is, and will remain, excessively restrictive. Indeed, on the
basis of current law, tax revenues will continue to grow much
faster than income,generating a fiscal squeeze that will choke off
expansions long before full employment is reached.For this rea-
son,we urge the new majority in Congress to retain at least some
of President George W.Bush’s tax cuts while reforming the AMT
to reduce the growing tax burden on middle-class families.
The Macroeconomic Setting
The housing industry played a major role in fueling the recov-
ery after the last recession. It has been estimated that while the
housing sector added 1.1 million jobs between 2001 and 2005,
the rest of the economy actually shed 1.2 million jobs; housing
investment grew at a 9 percent pace from 2002 through 2005
(Bajaj and Leonhardt 2006). However, in the last few months,
the bottom appears to have dropped out of the market after a
two-year campaign by the Fed during which it raised interest
rates 17 times.Almost all of the recent housing market data are
poor, with rising inventories of unsold homes and stagnating
prices. According to Census Bureau data, housing cost burdens
rose sharply across the country from 2000 to 2005,due to higher
interest rates as well as cash-out financing and inflated purchase
prices (Scott and Archibold 2006).The financial obligation ratio
climbed steadily, from about 18 percent at year-end 2004 to
above 18.7 percent at year-end 2005—almost as high as it had
been at the close of 2001, when consumers cut spending going
into recession (Valance 2006). Higher interest rates affect more
than the housing market: nonmortgage interest payments have
also grown quickly,up more than 25 percent since June 2004,to
a total of $231.4 billion as of June 2006 (Peters 2006).
To make matters worse, rising inflation combined with slow
wage growth has eroded the real purchasing power of American
wage incomes. Inflation was up 2.4 percent from June 2005 to
June 2006 (Peters 2006; Uchitelle 2006). While job growth has
been sluggish over the entire period since the last recession (at
least, in comparison with job growth during the Clinton expan-
sion), it slowed considerably in 2006. Preliminary numbers indi-
cate that job growth declined, from 230,000 new jobs in August
to only 79,000 in October,rising slightly to 132,000 in November
(Uchitelle 2006). The real hourly pay of the median worker has
actually fallen by 2 percent since 2003 (Bajaj and Leonhardt
2006).There have been only three extended periods since World
War II during which pay hikes have been lower than the rate
of inflation: the 1970s, the late 1980s, and the current period.
The previous two episodes saw significant deterioration of con-
sumer sentiments, and the current period is no exception.
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Americans say they expect to see widespread unemployment
within the next five years (Uchitelle 2006).
Fiscal Drag
In addition to the pressures on households due to rising mort-
gage interest rates,stagnating home prices,and falling real wages,
tax liabilities are rising quickly—at a pace far above growth of
personal income or government spending. Of course, many wel-
come the “improvement” to the federal budget, as the deficit
declines on trend.Figure 1 shows the budget deficit in both nom-
inal terms and as a ratio of GDP. The flip side to deficit reduc-
tion,however,is deterioration of private sector finances,since the
federal budget has “improved” only because the government is
taking more out of the economy (taxes) relative to the amount it
is putting in (expenditures). Numerous Strategic Analyses using
the Levy Institute’s stock-flow macroeconomic model of the three
sector balances—private,current account,and government—have
warned of the continuing imbalance of these sectors. Suffice it to
note that given the current U.S. trade deficit (around 6 percent
of GDP), as the federal budget falls to about 2 percent of GDP,
the private sector must run a deficit of about 4 percent of GDP.
American households have been tapped out financially,and even-
tually the strain will become too great for them to continue
spending far more than they earn. The rising tax burden that is
reducing the federal budget deficit is adding to the squeeze.
Figure 2 plots GDP growth rates (nominal and inflation-
adjusted) along with the rate of growth of federal government
spending and revenues, and illustrates the rising tax burden.
Focusing on the growth of tax revenue over the last decade, it is
obvious that there have been some fairly dramatic reversals. In
the late 1990s,tax revenue was growing by as much as 10 percent
per year, far more quickly than government spending (around
3 percent per year) or real GDP (about 4 percent per year). The
“favorable”fiscal situation led, of course, to the Clinton budget
surpluses of 1997–2000.For reasons we will explain below,eco-
nomic expansions usually do lead to growth of tax revenue at 
a pace above the growth rate of GDP.At the same time,this phe-
nomenon sets up a fiscal drag, especially if the growth of tax
revenue exceeds by a large margin the growth of government
spending.We warned at the time that the fiscal situation reached
by 1998 would pull the economy into recession (Papadimitriou
and Wray 2001). By June 2001, real GDP growth collapsed to
zero,and tax revenue began an unprecedented four-year fall—by
March 2002, revenues were falling at an annual rate of 15 per-
cent—partly due to tax relief but also in large measure a result of
the recession.Only near the end of 2003 did tax revenues begin to
rise, and the growth rate of revenues continued to climb through
2005. Revenues are now increasing at a rate of almost 15 percent
on a year-over-year basis, far outstripping growth of government
spending (growing half as fast),nominal GDP growth (less than 7
percent), and real GDP growth (just over 3 percent).
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The current situation,with tax revenues growing five times
faster than real GDP, is historically unusual, reminiscent of the
period before the Reagan-era recession.However,the late 1970s
and early 1980s was a period of high inflation, which drove tax
revenue growth through “bracket creep.”The mounting real tax
burden was somewhat moderated by the rapid growth of nom-
inal income. Comparing tax revenue growth with the rate of
growth of nominal GDP, one finds that the current period is
even more unusual: there is no other extended period since the
1970s in which taxes have risen twice as fast as nominal GDP.
Thus, the real tax burden is rising at a faster pace today precisely
because nominal incomes are not growing very quickly. Finally,
many of the previous periods that saw tax revenues increasing at
more than 10 percent per year were followed closely by recession:
1972–74 (average = 12 percent); 1977–81 (average = 15 percent);
1999–2000 (average = 10 percent). The exceptions (1984–85,
1996–98) were during earlier stages of economic expansions,with
average growth rates of tax revenues a bit lower than 10 percent.
Medium-Term Budget Projections
In its January 2006 Budget Outlook, the Congressional Budget
Office noted that individual income tax receipts had increased
by 14.6 percent over the previous year, and projected that tax
revenues would again outstrip economic growth in 2006, with
individual income tax receipts growing by 8.2 percent. Indeed,
the CBO estimated that total federal tax revenues would con-
tinue to grow faster than the economy as a whole, rising from
17.5 percent of GDP in 2005 to 19.8 percent in 2016 (Table 1).
All of this growth would be attributed to individual income tax
receipts, which would climb from 7.5 percent of GDP in 2005 to
10.5 percent in 2016. The percent of GDP absorbed by taxes in
2016 would reach a level achieved only five times since WWII.
Figure 3 shows actual and projected revenues by source, as a
share of GDP,from 1962 to 2016.About half of the dramatic pro-
jected rise in individual income taxes is driven by scheduled
changes in existing tax laws.The most important of these includes
higher statutory rates on capital gains and dividends beginning
in 2009,a reduced AMT exemption (postponed until 2007),and
the expiration of many other tax relief provisions in 2011. The
balance of the projected rise is due to growth of distributions
from tax-deferred plans and IRAs,“real bracket creep,”and rising
numbers of taxpayers falling under provisions of the AMT. We
will explore these issues in further detail in the next section.
The AMT and the Coming April Surprise
Detailed data on tax revenues are available from the CBO’s
Monthly Budget Review.As reported on July 7,2006,total tax rev-
enues for the first three quarters of fiscal year 2006 came in at 13
percent, or $206 billion, above revenues for the same period the
previous year; by contrast, outlays were up only 8.6 percent, or
$165 billion, so the deficit shrank by $41 billion. (The total fed-
eral budget deficit was $248 billion in FY 2006, down $71 billion
from FY 2005;as a share of GDP,the deficit was 1.9 percent,down
from 2.6 percent, per the CBO’s review of November 6, 2006.)
This was the second-highest rate of revenue growth over the first
nine months of any year for the past 25 years—exceeded only by
2005’s growth rate. Corporate income taxes were up 26 percent
($52 billion). Individual income and payroll taxes withheld from
paychecks were up by 8 percent ($88 billion) when compared
with those from the same nine-month period in 2005. However,
nonwithheld individual income and payroll taxes were up 20
percent ($59 billion). These nonwithheld taxes include quarterly
payments as well as final payments for the year, and result from
taxes owed on nonwage personal income, from changes in tax
laws, and from the AMT. During 2005, individual income and
payroll tax receipts increased by 14.6 percent; yet, while withheld
taxes rose by just 4.4 percent, nonwithheld taxes rose by 32 per-
cent. The significant jump in nonwithheld taxes was caused pri-
marily by increased tax liabilities resulting from capital gains, as
well as the temporary tax relief provided in 2004 by the Jobs and
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (which led to an
unexpected tax increase in 2005).
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During an expansion,revenues from individual income taxes
normally can be expected to rise faster than personal income by
approximately 1 percentage point per year due to what is known
as real bracket creep.This occurs as real economic growth raises
real income and pushes taxpayers into higher tax brackets.
However, the gap between growth of tax receipts and personal
income growth has been running far above that, and is expected
to remain between 2 and 4 percentage points for 2007.According
to the CBO, this is an effect of “strong increases of nonwage
income, along with added liabilities from the alternative mini-
mum tax” (CBO 2006a, p. 85). The nonwage income that gen-
erates rising tax liabilities includes profits of S corporations,IRA
distributions, and realized capital gains. However, of potentially
greater importance in coming years is the revenue growth gen-
erated by the AMT.
Higher-income taxpayers are required to calculate taxes
under both the AMT and regular income tax schedules. The
AMT uses a different definition of income, has a higher tax rate,
and excludes some exemptions allowed by the regular income tax
method. The most important difference is that the AMT disal-
lows credits for dependents,medical expenses,and state and local
taxes, thus hitting married couples with children and those who
live in high-tax states the hardest. Indeed, it is sometimes called
the “blue state tax”because taxpayers on the East and West Coasts
are more likely to lose their state and local tax credits due to the
AMT—resulting in an average extra tax liability of $6,813
(Montgomery 2006). Ironically, the impact of the AMT is great-
est on those with incomes of $100,000 to $500,000, since most
upper-income taxpayers already pay a higher rate through the
regular income tax. The AMT also exacts a big penalty from
larger families:in 2007,only 11 percent of taxpayers with no chil-
dren will be subject to the AMT, while 40 percent of those with
three or more children will fall under its provisions (Leiserson
and Rohaly 2006). Furthermore, the “marriage penalty” is high.
In 2006, those filing joint returns were five times more likely to
pay the AMT than were single filers; by 2017, half of all joint fil-
ers will pay the AMT, while only 5 percent of those filing single
returns will be subject to its steeper rates.
Originally enacted to prevent high-income taxpayers from
taking full advantage of various tax preferences,the AMT is not
indexed to inflation.In 1970,only 20,000 taxpayers were subject
to the AMT. This figure rose to 4 million in 2005, and, unless
Congress acts, it will reach 23.4 million in 2007 and 32.4 million
in 2010 (Table 2).If Congress extends the Bush tax cuts that are
scheduled to expire beginning in 2008, reducing the regular tax
bill below the AMT, the number will grow significantly larger,
to nearly half of all taxpayers by 2017. Thus, each year greater
numbers of middle-income earners fall under the AMT’s provi-
sions, which, by limiting exemptions, deductions, and credits,
result in higher tax liabilities. By 2010, half of all taxpayers with
incomes between $75,000 and $100,000 will be required to pay
the AMT. If the Bush tax cuts were extended, by 2017, 90 per-
cent of filers with incomes between $100,000 and $500,000
would pay the AMT, and 64.3 percent of adjusted gross income
(AGI) would be reported on their returns; if the tax cuts were
allowed to “sunset,” 44.4 percent of AGI would be reported on
their returns.
As the CBO (2006a) has noted,most taxpayers do not antic-
ipate falling under the provisions of the AMT, recognizing the
additional tax liability only when they file their returns. Thus,
the majority of AMT taxes are not paid until the following
year—with interest and penalties. The “April surprise” is com-
pounded because of peculiarities associated with recent legis-
lated tax changes—the Orwellian-named Economic Growth and
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, the Jobs and Growth Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003,and the Working Families Tax
Relief Act of 2004—which phase in and out various provisions
that affect the AMT.For example,the 2004 law reduced the AMT
bite for 2005, and was extended for 2006; without that exten-
sion,twice as many taxpayers—eight million—would have been
required to pay the AMT in 2006 (Leiserson and Rohaly 2006).
Unless the House and Senate agree on another extension,18 mil-
lion more households will be newly subjected to the AMT in
2007. Ironically, tax relief has pushed more families into the
AMT camp, as lower regular tax rates mean that more taxpayers
find the AMT tax liability higher.Under current law,many of the
tax relief provisions passed during the first administration of
George W. Bush will expire in 2011—allowing taxpayers to pay
the (higher) regular income taxes rather than the AMT, so that
AMT receipts could fall sharply, from $97 billion in 2010 to $43
billion in 2012 (CBO 2006b). However, by 2012, the number of
taxpayers subject to the AMT will start to rise again because the
AMT is not inflation-indexed,generating a sort of bracket creep
as more middle-income earners find themselves above the AMT
threshold.Due to the complexities associated with these tax pro-
visions, not to mention the unpredictability of congressional
maneuvers, the number of households hit with April surprises
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The AMT and Tax Reform
As a source of revenue for the federal government, the AMT is
already important and will become increasingly so. Total AMT
revenue amounted to $24 billion in 2005. In 2007, 26 percent of
taxpayers will be subject to the AMT, generating about $70 bil-
lion in revenues. To put this in perspective, total revenue gener-
ated by estate and gift taxes in recent years has been $25 billion
annually; excise taxes have run about $55 billion. Hence, elimi-
nation of the AMT would be nearly equivalent to dropping all
estate, gift, and excise taxes for the current year. In 2010, AMT
revenues will reach $117 billion.As Table 2 shows, dropping the
AMT would reduce federal government revenues by $944 billion
over the next decade if the Bush tax cuts were allowed to expire,
or by $1.75 trillion if the tax cuts were extended. For compari-
son, if all tax provisions that are due to expire before 2016 were
extended—excluding those having to do with the AMT—the
resulting reduction in projected revenue would total about $2.1
trillion over the next decade (calculated from Table 4-10, CBO
2006a).1 Indeed, elimination of the AMT would “cost” almost
twice as much as the extension of the sum of tax breaks accorded
estates and gifts, dividends, and capital gains. These, of course,
are some of the provisions of the Bush tax cuts that are most
likely to be considered for “sunsetting” by Democrats on the
grounds that most of the benefits go to high-income earners.
Thus,even if Democrats were to allow the most controver-
sial parts of the tax cuts to expire and instead adopt a “pay-go”
rule, they would still have to come up with nearly $500 billion
in spending cuts or tax increases over the next decade to offset
revenue lost through elimination of the AMT. Among the few
remaining expiring provisions that are large enough to make a
real difference are the expanded 10 percent bracket ($262 bil-
lion of tax relief to low-income filers over the next decade) and
the lower tax brackets (tax rates of 25, 28, 33, and 35 percent,
elimination of which would generate $385 billion more in rev-
enue). It would appear to be quite unlikely that Democrats will
allow these provisions to expire, raising tax rates across the
board. The plethora of other provisions no doubt contains
some items that can be dropped; however, most are so small
that virtually all of them would have to be eliminated to offset
revenue losses resulting from repeal of the AMT.
Hence,a better course of action is to reform the AMT without
considering “offsets.” Because the AMT no longer targets “rich”
taxpayers, it should be repealed. If Congress wants to increase the
progressivity of the personal income tax,it can place limits on cer-
tain exemptions and tax credits above an AGI threshold that is
indexed to inflation. Not only does current law require ever-rising
numbers of middle-income taxpayers to fall under the AMT,
but it also has numerous unfair features: it is complex, so that
most taxpayers do not recognize additional liabilities until they
file; and it targets married couples, homeowners who live in
high-tax states,large families,those with high medical expenses,
workers with unreimbursed employee expenses, families with
child-care credits, plaintiffs who win lawsuits (who are not
allowed to deduct lawyers’fees), providers of Indian employment
and of low-cost housing (tax credits are disallowed for a wide
range of such “social purpose”activity),and so on.Elimination of
the AMT would reduce income tax revenue by 9.4 percent in
2010—roughly 4 percent of projected federal revenue and 0.7 per-
cent of projected GDP. Based on current law, individual income
taxes will rise from 7.5 percent of GDP in 2005 to 8.6 percent in
2010; if the AMT were repealed, individual income taxes would
rise to 7.9 percent of GDP. If the Bush tax cuts were extended
through 2017,the total bite of the AMT would rise to $265 billion;
hence,repeal of the AMT would lower individual income taxes by
more than 12 percent,or about 1.2 percent of GDP.Since total tax
revenues are estimated to grow by about 2.2 percentage points
over the next decade, elimination of the AMT would wipe out
almost half of that increase. Extending all of the Bush tax cuts
except for those concerned with tax breaks for estates and gifts,
capital gains, and dividends would amount to a similar figure.2
Thus,much of the scheduled rise in income taxes relative to GDP
would be eliminated if Congress were to repeal the AMT and
extend most of the tax relief provisions.
Conclusion
While the cause-and-effect is complex, with relatively robust
growth driving tax receipts, we have examined some of the rea-
sons that taxes rise so much faster than income.At some point,
this will have an impact on consumer spending, as households
and perhaps firms find themselves squeezed. As spending and
income decline, tax revenue growth will begin to fall; however,
based on the results shown in Figure 1, this appears to occur
with a lag.As indicated by the rapid growth in receipts of quar-
terly payments made against nonwithheld income and payroll
tax liabilities, many taxpayers are already aware that personal
income taxes are outstripping income gains. Many others will
not find out until they do their returns in April that the amountThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 9
of taxes being withheld is too low.Even if growth of spending and
income were to begin to fall soon, the growth of tax liabilities
could remain high for many months,adding to deflationary pres-
sures. Given this restrictive fiscal stance, it is likely that the cur-
rent expansion will soon come to an end.
Moreover, we are also concerned about the medium-term
consequences of the structure of the tax code.Current tax law will
generate revenue growth faster than GDP growth whenever the
economy is expanding.This is due in part to scheduled sunsetting
of tax relief legislation passed in recent years, but also to provi-
sions of the AMT. We would urge Congress to move quickly to
reform or eliminate altogether the AMT, and to consider extend-
ing many of the tax relief provisions. Given the existing bias of
current tax law toward rapid growth of revenues,there is ample
room for reform without reducing individual income tax rates
below their current levels—which are already arguably too high.
Notes
1. The majority of these provisions were enacted by the Eco-
nomic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act and mod-
ified by the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
and the Working Families Tax Relief.
2. The “cost” of eliminating the AMT falls when tax provi-
sions are not allowed to expire. Hence, if Congress were to
approve extensions for all of the provisions scheduled to
expire before 2016, the tax revenue reduction due to elim-
ination of the AMT would fall. We have not attempted to
calculate this complex interaction.
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